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Child Labour and EU Law and Policy: A Regional 
Solution for a Global Issue1 
Child Labour and EU Law and Policy 
Nuno Ferreira 
 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the role of the EU in creating and developing labour 
policies that affect children. The analysis will be framed within the context of 
the global debates about child labour, and will highlight the role that the EU 
might play in those debates. The chapter starts by sketching the main lines of 
the ‘child labour’ debate, the qualitative and quantitative significance of 
children in the EU labour market, and the relevant EU competences. It will 
then touch upon a range of EU labour law instruments that affect children, 
both as direct addressees – especially the Young Workers Directive – and 
collateral beneficiaries, including a variety of tools that address sex discrimi-
nation. Finally, the chapter will assess the compatibility between the instru-
ments and policies considered and, amongst others, the CRC, the relevant 
ILO instruments, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The conclusion 
will determine the scope for improvement of the current state of affairs, and 
present policy recommendations.  
 1. Child labour: A global solution for a global issue? 
Whether children – here understood as anyone below the age of 18, in ac-
cordance with the CRC – should be allowed to participate in the labour mar-
ket or in any way engage with the world of work (and to what extent) is an 
old and contentious debate. The CRC tries to offer some guidance on this 
matter, by establishing ‘the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or 
to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health 
or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development’ (Article 32). This 
                                                          
1 The author wishes to thank the editors of this book and the participants at the 2013 Socio-
Legal Studies Association annual conference (York, UK) for their helpful comments and 
suggestions, and Alison Morley for the thorough copy-editing. 
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has, however, been insufficient to provide clarity on what precisely are the 
limits to children’s participation in the labour market. For these purposes, the 
notion of ‘child labour’ has been developed in relation to those forms of work 
that are regarded as detrimental to children’s physical and mental develop-
ment and, therefore, should be prohibited. Even understanding ‘child labour’ 
in these narrow terms, the ILO estimates that there are currently around 168 
million children throughout the world who carry out work that can be classi-
fied as ‘child labour’ (ILO 2015). 
Although child labour debates focus mostly on practices that occur outside 
of the EU, the phenomenon is anything but absent within the EU. Despite the 
lack of reliable data (a problem exacerbated by the high number of, often 
young, children working in the informal economy, in domestic environments, 
in family businesses, and others generally not declared), the number of chil-
dren in the EU working for pay, profit or family gain could reach 7.5 million 
(Rodríguez et al. 2007: 4). Leaving aside the insurmountable definitional and 
logistical difficulties in measuring the extent to which children work (Buck et 
al. 2011: 175ff), trade unions and media reports have made it clear that the 
economic crisis and weakening of the social welfare state have rendered 
‘child labour’ in Europe a common phenomenon, affecting particularly mi-
grant and ethnic minority children. Children dropping out of school too early 
and acting as sibling-carers, sex workers, farm hands, shop assistants for 
heavy work and, worst of all, members of local mafias (as beggars, prosti-
tutes or drug dealers), are becoming dangerously normalised patterns (ITUC 
2011; Allegra 2012; Nadeau 2012). Other less discussed risks concern cross-
border young workers engaged in construction work and services, and au pair 
workers engaged under sui generis agreements often outside the scope of 
labour law (Rodríguez et al. 2007: 107). 
Independently of the statistics and the types of work involved, the attrac-
tiveness of involving children with the world of labour will always exist (at 
least from the perspective of the recipient of the outcome of that work), due 
to the low costs and abundance of workers available (Van Bueren 1995: 263). 
It is therefore crucial that policy- and decision-makers have a clear idea of the 
values and objectives that should guide them in their discourse and action. 
Any measured answer needs to consider health, developmental, educational, 
social, economic, political and ethical issues. Global debates have raised 
various arguments, in favour of either a welfare approach or an autonomy 
approach. On the one hand, one may argue that children’s psychological and 
physical development may be jeopardised if they are allowed to carry out 
working activities, especially those entailing particular risks, and that their 
time should be dedicated to (unpaid) social interactions, education, and a 
range of activities that may enhance their well-being and nurture their poten-
tial. Also, letting children work perpetuates economic, educational and social 
disadvantages and inequalities, besides generally worsening labour and social 
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standards (Buck et al. 2011: 169). It has been suggested that eliminating 
‘child labour’ and offering universal education can bring about vast economic 
benefits (ILO 2003). On the other hand, arguments in favour of a more flexi-
ble approach to working children relate to children’s desire to become inde-
pendent (namely economically), be helpful to their families, feel part of their 
social environments, and exercise their ‘right to work’to fulfil their needs and 
construct their identity (Van Bueren 1995: 264; Ochaíta et al. 2000: 25; Han-
son and Vandaele 2003; Hanson and Nieuwenhuys 2013; Stalford 2014). 
This chapter will situate itself within a welfare approach. It is submitted 
that the autonomy of children and carers on this matter is legitimately cur-
tailed on the grounds of the children’s best interests and the public interest in 
protecting children from detrimental effects to their physical, mental and 
moral development, as well as on the grounds of a state’s obligation to safe-
guard the rights of children to physical and mental integrity, health and edu-
cation. Heed needs to be paid to children’s autonomy, right to participation 
and privacy in this context in order to achieve a balanced overall policy, but 
these should not outbalance the importance of protecting children from harm-
ful activities. Indeed, it is not sensible to use children’s rights to autonomy, 
participation and privacy as a shield to defend exploitative practices that 
barely carry any benefit to the children in question and are, in fact, unethical 
means to create profit for others. Also, whilst the ‘child labour’ debate on a 
global scale may be accused of ethnocentrism (Boyden 1997), and a ‘regula-
tive approach’ (as opposed to an ‘abolitionist approach’) may deserve atten-
tion in developing countries (Hanson and Vandaele 2003), in a European 
context the peril of ethnocentrism is practically non-existent in respect of 
‘child labour’. Above all, the socio-economic standards in the EU do not 
allow for the types of concessions admitted in debates regarding child labour 
in developing countries; on the contrary, much more demanding policies in 
this regard need to be implemented in order to reflect the (relative) degree of 
development across the EU. That may explain why, independently of region-
al socio-economic-cultural nuances (Rodríguez et al. 2007: 97-99), a social 
and economic ‘abolitionist’ outlook on this subject-matter is generally fa-
voured in the prevailing legal and official discourses (including in the ‘new’ 
EU Member States: Calvo/Rodríguez 2007: 13-21). Globalisation is making 
child labour all the more pressing a problem (Buck et al. 2011:187), and 
being permissive or flexible on this subject is not the way to achieve the 
objectives of the EU or any of its Member States. Children are, in principle, 
better placed in educational, family and sport/leisure social settings rather 
than in work places. This means that the dividing line between (unlawful) 
child labour and (lawful) child work on the continuum of child involvement 
with economic production should be pushed towards reducing the scope for 
child work, thus widening the scope of what should be considered child la-
bour and therefore prohibited. Any deviation from this should be treated as 
262 Nuno Ferreira  
 
an exception and thoroughly scrutinised. This approach will be discussed in 
greater detail and borne in mind throughout this chapter. 
It is therefore important to devise a tight and well implemented legal 
framework to tackle issues related to children’s involvement with the world 
of labour. This is all the more so in the light of the increasingly enthusiastic 
(even if perhaps sometimes only rhetorical) commitment to children’s rights 
and well-being by the EU institutions (European Commission 2011), and 
reflected in the Treaties (Articles 3(3) and (5) TEU). This commitment to 
children’s rights has also featured in the EU external policy, as both the 
Commission and the Council have shown some interest in offering children a 
special place in EU external policies, particularly with regard to the fight 
against child labour (European Commission 2008; Council of Ministers of 
the European Union 2010; Vandenhole, this collection). This chapter will 
focus on EU internal policies and analyse whether the EU has achieved a 
satisfactory degree of protection for children’s rights and interests in the field 
of labour, and, if not, what else can be done to improve the current state of 
affairs. With this in mind, section 2 sets the scene by discussing the nature 
and scope of EU labour law and policy more generally. Section 3 then ex-
plores the range of EU labour law tools that have, in different ways, affected 
children, and section 4 assesses the level of protection offered by these tools 
to working children and, in particular, their compatibility with other, more 
fundamental instruments, such as the CRC, ILO Conventions and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, Section 5 suggests the ways in which 
current EU measures in this area might be improved. This analysis also hints 
at what role the EU should try to play in addressing child labour in its rela-
tionship with non-EU countries. 
 2. EU labour policy: Competences and evolution 
Until 1987, when the Single European Act (SEA) came into force, the EEC 
Treaty contained extremely weak labour and social law provisions. There 
was, in fact, a complete lack of competence to legislate with regard to labour 
standards, as Articles 117 and 118 EEC only contained a ‘political pro-
gramme’ (Hartwig 2008: 245), comprising references to common goals and 
values, and the commitment to promoting collaboration between Member 
States. With the SEA, Articles 118a and 118b were introduced and the Com-
munity became, for the first time, competent to regulate on health and safety 
related matters in the field of labour. Only minimum standards could be set 
by directives produced on the basis of this competence, precluding full har-
monisation in the field. Article 118a EEC remained unchanged by the 1992 
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Treaty of Maastricht and it was on its basis that the Community produced the 
Young Workers Directive (Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994 on the pro-
tection of young people at work (hereafter ‘YWD’) analysed below). 
Soon after the introduction of these competences, the 1989 Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers (Community Charter) was 
adopted by 11 out of the then 12 Member States (the UK only adopting it 
when the Charter was (partly) incorporated into the Treaties by the 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam). This Community Charter enshrines a range of labour-
related rights, and it was approved as a ‘declaration’, hence being considered 
merely as a (moral) commitment rather than imposing legal obligations as 
such (Article 28). Still, on the basis of the Community Charter, the Commis-
sion launched the 1992 Social Action Programme which included 47 legisla-
tive proposals related to the Charter rights. This included several landmark 
directives such as those on pregnant workers,2 working time,3 and, crucially, 
the YWD. 
Subsequent treaties have not significantly amended the relevant provi-
sions, and so EU competence to regulate labour matters has remained largely 
unchanged since 1997. Subsequent Treaties have, however, increasingly 
endowed the EU with competences in the field of justice and home affairs, as 
well as some limited supporting and coordinating competences in the fields 
of social inclusion (Articles 9 and 151-153 TFEU) and education (Articles 6, 
9 and 165-166 TFEU), enabling the EU institutions to legislate in labour-
connected fields, as will be seen below. Most significantly, it has been the 
CJEU that, on some occasions (even if not always with consensually positive 
results), has pushed forward a social and human rights-driven agenda (name-
ly in relation to gender equality, see 3.1 below). The production of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights and its later inclusion into the Treaties,4 also in-
creased the number of labour-related provisions from which the EU institu-
tions, Member States and individuals may draw to potentially enhance their 
positions (further explored in 4.3 below). That said, a substantial proportion 
of the EU’s work on labour and child related matters are nowadays dealt with 
within the context of non-binding (soft-law) instruments and the Open Meth-
od of Co-ordination (OMC – discussed at greater length in 3.3 below). EU 
labour and social policy may therefore be characterised as significant, albeit 
still considerably limited by the reduced number of competences the EU 
possesses in this field and the non-binding nature of many of its outcomes. 
                                                          
2 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to en-
courage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers 
who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding. 
3 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organ-
isation of working time. 
4 By the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. 
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Bearing this in mind, the next section will consider how the EU devised a 
range of tools more or less connected with the labour world, which have had 
an impact on children within the EU.  
 3. Children in the EU’s (internal) labour policy  
3.1 Children as incidental beneficiaries 
By placing a strong emphasis on the role of the labour force in the creation of 
an integrated market, the Community inevitably affected families and chil-
dren. Consequently, although it took several decades for the EU institutions 
to see children as potential direct and specific beneficiaries of EU law, sever-
al of its policies and instruments in the context of labour have had more or 
less indirect effects on children. Policies on free movement of workers al-
lowed workers’ children to move with them, thus letting them enjoy a poten-
tially better standard of life. The 1960s and 1970s were particularly prolific in 
creating indirect benefits to workers’ children, namely by reinforcing the 
residence rights of workers’ family members,5 as well as of service provid-
ers’ family members.6 Although dependent on their parents’ right to move 
and reside as workers, children also acquired specific rights, including the 
right to study and train in the host Member State under the same conditions 
as nationals of that State,7 and the right to remain in that State once the em-
ployment relationship or service provision activity of their parents ended.8 
This obviously allowed children to become workers in their own right in the 
host Member State in due course, thus entitling children to EU labour-related 
rights, albeit via their parents’ exercise of EU law rights. This line of policy 
was strengthened by instruments that specifically allowed dependent children 
of workers, service providers, students and others, to work as dependent 
workers or as self-employed.9 The rationale for all these provisions benefiting 
children, however, lies in the fact that they were seen as ‘obstacles’ to their 
                                                          
5 Article 10 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68, Council Directive 68/360/EEC, Regulation (EEC) 
No 1251/70. 
6 Council Directive 73/148/EEC. 
7 Article 12 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68, now replaced by Article 10 Regulation (EU) No 
492/2011 without any amendment. 
8 Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 and Council Directive 75/34/EEC, now repealed and replaced 
by Directive 2004/38/EC, in particular Article 12. 
9 Council Directives 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC on the right of residence, all 
replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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parents’ free movement and, therefore, needed to be ‘addressed’ for the sake 
of securing the economic benefits of labour free movement – hence children 
were not autonomous right-holders, but simply possessed ‘parasitic’ entitle-
ments (McGlynn 2002: 388).  
The sex (later, gender) equality agenda has also been at the core of the 
Community’s social policy since its inception. The original Article 119 EEC 
(now 157 TFEU) on gender equality in pay was complemented relatively 
early on by secondary legislation and supported by a rich line of European 
case law. The Community pursued gender equality in the field of employ-
ment into the 1980s and 1990s, often following the lead of the Community 
Courts, in relation to pregnant workers, social security, self-employment and 
childcare. Along with many other hard- and soft-law instruments, as well as 
measures beyond the realm of employment, the EU has undoubtedly contrib-
uted to greater gender equality, which has improved women’s working lives 
and, consequently, family lives and the amount (and perhaps even quality) of 
childcare that parents can provide. 
What is highlighted here is the indirect relevance of these instruments for 
children. This range of labour-related instruments indirectly benefited chil-
dren by ensuring, for example, that the adults caring for them would only 
have to work for a limited number of hours, possess some flexibility in their 
working arrangements, enjoy time off work in case of pregnancy/adoption/
maternity/paternity, and consequently receive more income and/or time to 
dedicate to the children. Still, throughout this long period the interests and 
perspectives of children were “either being sidelined, or addressed only in 
terms of their future status as 'productive' workers” (Ruxton 2005: 137), 
something particularly noticeable in the context of the EU’s work-family 
reconciliation policy (James 2012). This was about to change in the 1990s. 
3.2 Children as direct beneficiaries 
Although it was only in the 1990s that an EU instrument directly addressing 
working children was developed, children could already have been consid-
ered to be (at least potentially) direct beneficiaries of EU labour law and 
policy in the light of instruments and policies relating to free movement of 
workers. Indeed, such instruments did directly benefit children, despite not 
addressing them specifically. From the moment that children may legally 
constitute workers, they may also exercise their right to free movement – not 
as indirect beneficiaries of the free movement of their parents, but as direct 
beneficiaries of their own right to movement as workers (European Commis-
sion 2010: 13-15). The extent to which children have exercised this right is, 
however, unclear (due to lack of data), and most likely minimal, such that, in 
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reality, children remain marginal beneficiaries of the free movement of work-
er provisions.  
The first time that the EU contemplated children as a discrete group in the 
context of its labour policy was only in 1967, in the form of a Commission’s 
Recommendation on the protection of young workers.10 Twenty years later, 
in 1987, the European Parliament called on the Commission to put forward a 
harmonising instrument on child labour and on Member States to ratify the 
ILO instruments on the subject-matter if they had not already done so.11 The 
Parliament’s initiative eventually bore fruit, and in 1992 the Commission 
presented its proposal for a Council directive on the protection of young 
people at work on the basis of its ‘health and safety’ competence (Article 
118a EEC), discussed above.12 The Commission used a range of instruments 
as sources of inspiration, including the 1959 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
the Child and the CRC. In its proposal, the Commission highlighted the 
wealth of evidence to the effect that young workers were more likely than 
adults to suffer detrimental effects, both physically and psychologically, from 
occupational risks and working conditions. 
The relatively unambitious aims of the proposal were clear from the start. 
The minimum age for admission to employment was already 15 or 16 in most 
Member States, so the minimum age (15) proposed by the Commission was 
not a challenging target. Also, minimum requirements regarding working 
time and rest periods were already in the process of being established by the 
1993 Working Time Directive (WTD),13 which meant that the proposal did 
not go much beyond what was already going to be available through the 
WTD. Moreover, the proposal excluded from its scope the provision of ser-
vices and self-employment, leaving unprotected all the children carrying out 
work in those contexts. Such lack of ambition may have been a strategy to 
achieve the political consensus required to approve the Directive, based on 
the assumption that the ILO standards were satisfactory and for the most part 
respected by Member States. 
Also, despite the reference to the CRC in the explanatory memorandum to 
the Commission’s proposal, the proposal itself did not make any reference to 
the CRC or adopt its terminology, namely ‘children’ as those under the age of 
18. Instead, giving preference to the then current classifications of the World 
Health Organization and ILO, the proposal distinguished between ‘children’ 
                                                          
10 Recommendation 67/125/EEC of 31 January 1967, OJ 13 February 1967, pp. 405-408. 
11 European Parliament, Resolution on Child Labour, Doc. A2-67/87, OJ C 190/44, 16 June 
1987. 
12 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on the protec-
tion of young people at work, COM(91) 543 final – SYN 383, Brussels, 17 March 1992, 
point 3. 
13 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organ-
isation of working time. 
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(under the age of 15) and ‘adolescents’ (between 15 and 18), all constituting 
‘young people’ (a distinction retained in Article 3 YWD). This distinction, 
although potentially empowering older children and promoting their autono-
my in the light of their increased capacities, risks endorsing an understanding 
that reduces the rights of older children and deprives them of their due pro-
tection. In the light of the more recent strengthening of the EU’s children’s 
rights agenda and reliance on the CRC in that context (especially since the 
2006 Commission Communication ‘Towards an EU Strategy on the Rights of 
the Child’),14 it would now make sense to refer to all of these ‘young people’ 
as children. 
Negotiations between and amongst Community institutions and Member 
States further watered down the Commission’s proposal. For example, the 
harmonisation of the minimum number of days of paid annual leave was 
removed, leaving only a provision on some annual rest, thus allowing for 
minimal, unpaid annual leave. A few aspects of the proposal, however, were 
improved. For example, light work was defined as work that is not likely to 
be harmful to the safety, health or development of children, nor to their at-
tendance at school, their participation in vocational guidance or training pro-
grammes approved by the competent authority, nor their capacity to benefit 
from the instruction received (Article 3(d) YWD). The original, much more 
permissive notion, referred to ‘all work which does not cause any abnormal 
fatigue’. Also, the required age to benefit from the exception afforded to 
combined work/training schemes and light work was raised to 14 (Article 
4(2)(b) and (c) YWD); derogations from the prohibition of light work below 
a certain age based on national practice and traditions (Article 3(3) of the 
Commission’s proposal) were eliminated as they were clearly excessive; and 
the maximum duration of work for children carrying out light work went 
down from 15 to 12 hours term-time per week, and from 3 to 2 hours per 
school day (Article 8(1)(b) YWD), thus securing time for homework and 
leisure. In addition, the cultural or similar activities derogation was subjected 
to further conditions during the negotiations, including not being likely to be 
harmful to children’s safety, health, development or education (Article 5(2) 
YWD). Moreover, the final wording of the provisions on the general obliga-
tions of employers and the vulnerability of young people (Articles 6 and 7 
YWD respectively) was strengthened, for example, by imposing on employ-
ers the duty to ‘adopt the measures necessary to protect the safety and health 
of young children’, rather than simply having to ‘take account of any specific 
risk to the physical and mental health and safety of the young persons’. 
Several contentious key issues remained unaddressed. Firstly, occasional 
or short-term work involving domestic service in a private household or non-
harmful work for a family undertaking can be excluded by Member States 
                                                          
14 COM(2006) 367 final, 4 July 2006. 
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from the Directive’s scope of protection (Article 2(2) YWD), despite research 
indicating that exploitation of working children very often occurs in domestic 
and family settings (Van Bueren 1995: 266) and that ‘occasional’ and ‘short-
term’ are vague terms. As Kenner highlights, it may be tempting to justify 
such an exception with “visions of grape picking and crop harvesting”, but 
“less comfortable Dickensian imagery of domestic exploitation of children” 
also comes quickly to mind (Kenner 2003: 183). The use of the ‘private 
sphere’ notion and public/private distinction to justify such derogations have 
rendered invisible/acceptable many types of work carried out by children in 
some Member States, such as domestic work, small errands, baby-sitting, 
newspaper delivery, gardening and caring for relatives (Larkins 2011). This 
exception has prioritised the deregulation agenda at the expense of children’s 
health and development, and the legislature should have to justify (and possi-
bly restrict) such a ground for derogation (Bond 1995). Also, “the ideologi-
cal, economic and pragmatic justifications for the immunity of some forms of 
this employment all depend upon a questionable belief in an impenetrable 
demarcation between the realm of the family on the one hand, and the market 
on the other” (Bond 1996: 291). Although any interference with the family 
and private realms obviously requires a great degree of justification and is 
associated with complex issues of parental autonomy and privacy, more pre-
cise and limiting wording should have been adopted for exceptions applicable 
to domestic service in a private household, or to non-harmful work for a 
family undertaking.  
Secondly, allowing derogation from the working time limits of 8 
hours/day and 40 hours/week on the basis of ‘objective grounds’, Article 8(5) 
YWD offers excessive flexibility to Member States (which is why the EESC 
proposed the deletion of such an exception).15 Either no such exception 
should have been included, or it should have been tempered by the inclusion 
of the consideration of the best interests of the child, as well as of the legiti-
macy of the grounds in question and proportionality of the derogation sought. 
Thirdly, the prohibition of night work between midnight and 4 a.m., which 
was absolute in the Commission’s initial proposal, ended up being weakened 
by allowing work during that period under certain circumstances and in cer-
tain areas (Article 9(2) YWD). Fourthly, the reference to sanctions in the 
Commission’s initial proposal was deleted, and the already-weak provision 
was renamed ‘measures’, its wording being amended from requiring penalties 
to be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ to simply ‘effective and pro-
portionate’ (Article 14 YWD). Even though the YWD is a directive, a more 
specific and detailed provision could be devised, as will be discussed below 
(section 5).  
                                                          
15 Opinion on the proposal for a Council Decision on the Protection of Young People at Work 
(92/C 313/19), 23 September 1992, OJ No C 313/92 P 70, 30 November 1992. 
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In sum, and anticipating the discussion below, the YWD merely aligned 
EU law with ILO standards, practically ignoring the CRC and hardly going 
beyond what most Member States already did. The Directive’s aims are 
worded generally and in positively protective terms: Article 1(3), second 
paragraph, for example, requires Member States to protect children from 
economic exploitation and any work that may have a negative impact on their 
development or education. Also, the YWD contains a non-reducing clause 
(Article 16), preventing Member States from using the Directive to reduce 
the domestic levels of protection offered to working children. Such provi-
sions have helped the YWD to become an important piece of labour legisla-
tion at EU level, as textbook coverage reflects. Nonetheless, apart from the 
potentially dangerous exclusion in Article 2(2) (see above), other loopholes 
have been included in the final version of the YWD (Articles 4 and 5). These 
include allowing children of any age to carry out cultural or similar activities, 
allowing children above the age of 14 to work under combined work/training 
schemes and perform light work, and allowing children above the age of 13 
to perform light work specified by national legislation, the last being ap-
proved against the will of the Parliament.16 Finally, Article 13 YWD also 
allows for a general force majeure derogation from working time, night 
work, rest periods and, at least in relation to children between the ages of 15 
and 18, breaks. Whilst this derogation may be appropriate for adult workers, 
it is not sensible to apply it to working children without any further re-
strictions (e.g. the best interests of the child, or an explicit legitimacy and 
proportionality test). Even allowing for concessions due to the fact that the 
legal basis used regards as a shared competence and only aims to set mini-
mum standards, as well as the fact that social/cultural/economic differences 
relevant to this debate can be identified across the EU, it is submitted that EU 
Member States could have aimed higher. 
The last step in this second phase of ‘children as direct beneficiaries’ con-
cerns the Equality Framework Directive.17 Although working children were 
already able to potentially benefit from existing EU equality instruments 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex (discussed above) and race/
ethnic background,18 it is with the Framework Directive that children have 
become explicit and core beneficiaries of EU equality law. This is a funda-
mental instrument for children: EU law now enshrines their right to claim 
equality (interpreted in a broad sense, Article 3) and a significant degree of 
protection from discriminatory practices against them at work, above all on 
grounds of age (but also on grounds of sexual orientation, religious belief and 
                                                          
16 Decision of 9 March 1994, OJ No C 91/94 P 89, 28 March 1994. 
17 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
18 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treat-
ment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
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disability). This is not to be used as an argument for allowing children to 
enter the labour market earlier than permitted by the YWD or any domestic 
statute (as that would clearly go against the welfare approach adopted in this 
analysis), but simply to protect from discrimination those children who are of 
working age. Still, Article 6 dramatically reduces a significant legal hurdle to 
discriminatory practices. Due to pressure from Member States and the partic-
ular (largely perceived) impact of age in the field of work (especially with 
regard to older workers), Article 6 allows discrimination on grounds of age if 
occurring for an objectively and reasonably justified legitimate aim, includ-
ing legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training 
objectives, and if the means to achieve that aim are appropriate and neces-
sary. The fact that discrimination on grounds of age can be justified on the 
basis of this ‘extra’ reason clearly contributes to pushing age towards the 
bottom of the ‘hierarchy of grounds’ of EU anti-discrimination law. 
Case law has confirmed the latitude afforded to Member States in deter-
mining public policy objectives which justify derogating from age equality.19 
Nevertheless, in a more recent case, the CJEU held a national rule in relation 
to pilots’ compulsory retirement to be in violation of the prohibition of age 
discrimination.20 Also, the CJEU has already had the opportunity to use the 
Framework Directive to protect the interests of young (but not child) work-
ers: in Hütter21 concerning determination of pay; Kücükdeveci22 concerning 
calculating the notice period for dismissal; and in Hennigs and Mai23 con-
cerning a national collective agreement providing for differences in basic pay 
according to age. Other contexts in which the Framework Directive may be 
used to fight discrimination against working children include the offer of 
more precarious employment arrangements (e.g., allowing more successive 
fixed-term contracts for younger workers than for older ones, as advocated in 
the Netherlands and Spain) and lower salaries (e.g., paying younger workers 
a proportion of the minimum salary payable to older workers merely on 
grounds of age, as occurs in Greece and the UK) (Sargeant 2010: 474; Simms 
2011: 20-21). Domestic case law also reveals the potential to use age anti-
discrimination provisions to protect young workers, as in the UK decision in 
Wilkinson v Springwell Engineering Ltd, concerning dismissal.24 Integration 
into the labour market should clearly not come at the cost of arbitrary dis-
                                                          
19 For example, C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, Judgment of 22 November 2005; 
C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel, Judgment of 16 October 2007; and C-
388/07, Age Concern England v SSBERR, Judgment of 5 March 2009. 
20 C-447/09, Prigge and others v Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Judgment of 13 September 2011. 
21 C-88/08, David Hütter v TechnischeUniversität Graz, Judgment of 18 June 2009. 
22 C-555/07, SedaKücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, Judgment of 19 January 2010. 
23 C-297/10 and C-298/10, Hennigs v Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, Land Berlin v Mai, Judgment of 
8 September 2011. 
24 ET/2507420/07. 
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criminatory practices. In any case, discrimination is only a small part of the 
range of detrimental treatment that working children may suffer, so not even 
a generous use of the Framework Directive is able to ensure a high degree of 
protection for them. 
3.3 Post-2000: A bi-cephalous era? 
In the post-2000s, the EU’s labour law and policy affecting children has been 
characterised by two completely different ‘faces’, thus bringing to mind a bi-
cephalous being. Indeed, for the last decade or so, the EU’s discourse con-
cerning the interconnection between children and the labour market has slow-
ly, but clearly, changed. Symptomatic of this are the instruments related to 
the Lisbon Agenda, the Europe 2020 Strategy, and OMC processes. Since the 
2001 White Paper ‘A New Impetus for European Youth’ (European Commis-
sion 2001) through to the current EU Youth Strategy, EU institutions have 
looked at children (and youth, i.e. those aged between 15 and 30, although it 
depends on the specific instrument) as one of two things, thus adopting either 
one of these ‘faces’: a problem to be solved (high unemployment rate, lack of 
qualifications matching the market needs, insufficient entrepreneurship, etc.) 
and/or as a means to achieve certain results (such as a more green and sus-
tainable economy, or a more ICT-skilled work force). Although the 2001 
White Paper placed some emphasis on participation, autonomy and values, in 
more recent documents the protective, participatory, autonomy and nurturing 
dimensions seem to be missing for the most part from the EU’s discourse. 
Considering its impact on personal development (including financial auton-
omy and family life) and social cohesion (including democratic engagement 
and involvement with civil society) (Simms 2011: 2), the relationship be-
tween children and the labour market surely deserves a more empathic and 
humane analysis. 
Admittedly, the EU has been prolific in initiatives regarding youth and its 
role in society. The EU’s overall objectives are noble, including enhancing 
cooperation between Member States,25 achieving smart, sustainable and in-
clusive (in reference to women and ethnic and migrant minorities) growth 
(European Commission 2010), reducing early school leaving,26 recognising 
non-formal and informal learning,27 and more generally reducing unemploy-
                                                          
25 Council Resolution of 27 November 2009 on a renewed framework for European coopera-
tion in the youth field (2010-2018). 
26 Council Recommendation of 28 June 2011 on policies to reduce early school leaving. 
27 Council Recommendation of 20 December 2012 on the validation of non-formal and infor-
mal learning. 
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ment and precariousness. All these measures contribute to the holistic ap-
proach commended below (section 5), thus enhancing, albeit indirectly, the 
EU policies from which children and youth may benefit. Still, the subtext of 
such instruments and documents is that policies designed for children and 
youth are means to achieve greater aims (generally improving the labour 
market and workers’ mobility), rather than to promote young people’s well-
being, quality of life or protection as such. In sum, a more humane perspec-
tive is missing. This trend became particularly clear with the 2005 European 
Youth Pact,28 designed to use youth to advance the Lisbon Agenda.  
Another good example of this is the assertion that  
the Europe 2020 flagship initiative, Youth on the Move, puts young people at the centre of 
the EU’s agenda to create an economy based on knowledge, research and innovation, high 
levels of education and skills in line with labour market needs, adaptability and creativity, 
inclusive labour markets and active participation in society (emphasis added). (European 
Commission 2010: 22) 
This is not an incidental formulation, since it is reiterated, for example, in the 
implicit cost-benefit analysis carried out by the Commission in its proposal 
for a Council Recommendation on Establishing a Youth Guarantee (Europe-
an Commission 2012b) and in speeches by the European Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (Andor 2013). Even potentially 
child-friendly and socially aware moves, such as the enthusiastic agenda of 
the Commission on improving education, are marred by a blunt servicing of 
market needs (European Commission 2012a): the result is the vision of an 
educational framework at the service of a more economically competitive 
society, rather than a better society in all respects. The message could not be 
clearer: young people are perceived primarily as an instrument and resource 
to achieve the goals of EU’s policies – in particular economic recovery – and 
answer businesses’ needs for certain skills, not as beneficiaries or addressees 
of the EU’s concerns and priorities. Other elements of such instruments and 
speeches, for example relating to social protection (European Commission 
2010: 17) or training (Andor 2013), do little to combat the utilitarian sub-text, 
especially if one recalls the restricted competences of the EU in these fields 
in comparison with the broader competences regarding market integration 
and labour movement. This restricts such issues crucial to children to the 
remit of exchange of best practices, peer reviews and mutual learning activi-
ties within the context of the OMC, whilst persistently overlooking key issues 
such as pay and precariousness (as highlighted by the Parliament with regard 
to the Youth Guarantee).29 This scenario begs the question: should the EU’s 
governance of children’s rights really be concentrating on children as “human 
                                                          
28 Annex 1 of Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 22-23 March 2005 
(7619/05). 
29 Resolution of 16 January on a Youth Guarantee (2012/2901(RSP)). Strasbourg, 16 January 
2013. 
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capital for economic production” (Larkins 2011: 473) or as interested parties 
whose rights and needs should guide the EU children’s agenda? 
Although in the examples given above the EU seems to regard children as 
a means to an end (utilitarian approach), the EU often also sees children and 
childhood as ends in themselves (humanitarian approach). At the humanitari-
an end of the utilitarian-humanitarian spectrum of the post-2000 EU policy 
affecting children in the context of labour, are instruments designed to com-
bat sexual exploitation and human trafficking, produced on the basis of Arti-
cles 79(2)(d) and 83(1) TFEU. Sexual abuse becomes sexual exploitation 
when it possesses a commercial connotation, i.e., when it is connected to, for 
example, the use of children in prostitution, pornographic publications, 
and/or trafficking for sexual purposes. Hence the usual link between sexual 
abuse and sexual exploitation, and the necessary link between sexual exploi-
tation and labour policy. Both child pornography and child prostitution are 
significant and increasing in Europe (UN 2003; UNICEF 2009: 36). 
The EU adopted a hard-law measure in relation to child sexual exploita-
tion for the first time in 2003 with the Council Framework Decision 2004/68 
of 22 December 2003, on combating the sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography, now replaced by Directive 2011/93/EU. Sexual exploita-
tion and forced labour go hand-in-hand with trafficking. The use of children 
as slaves or forced labourers, as well as in a range of illicit activities (espe-
cially as ‘drug mules’), has been on the radar of the UN and the Council of 
Europe for a few decades now.30 The EU first addressed this matter through a 
hard-law measure with the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA of 19 July 
2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, which has been replaced by 
the current Directive 2011/36/EU. The Preamble to the current Directive is 
extremely rich in references to children, going as far as recommending a 
child-rights approach to Member States’ anti-trafficking policies. The Pream-
ble makes reference to children as a particularly vulnerable group and to 
children’s best interests as protected by the CFR and the CRC. This Directive 
has exponentially improved the legal treatment of child trafficking at the EU 
level, thus constructively building on previous work carried out in conjunc-
tion with the ILO (International Labour Office 2009). 
Directives 2011/93/EU and 2011/36/EU are mutually supportive, as they 
address phenomena that often occur in a connected way, e.g., in the case of 
trafficking of children for sexual exploitation. The Commission’s ‘The EU 
Strategy towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012-16’31 
reflects such interconnectedness, albeit not to a sufficient extent, in particular 
                                                          
30 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation No. 989 on the Fight against 
Drug Abuse and Trafficking (1984); UN General Assembly Resolution on Use of Children 
in the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Rehabilitation of Drug-addicted Minors, A/RES/
43/121, adopted on 8 December 1988. 
31 COM(2012) 286 final. 
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with regard to children, as underlined by the Opinions of the Committee of 
the Regions32 and the European Economic and Social Committee.33 These 
two Directives enhance greatly the protection offered to children who are 
exploited in a labour context, upon being trafficked and/or in connection to 
sexual activities. This illustrates a ‘best practice’ at a global level of how 
child victims of trafficking and/or sexual exploitation should be protected and 
their welfare ensured. Also, in the light of the cross-border and global nature 
of these phenomena, these EU instruments constitute important elements for 
a framework of cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries, both by 
using (criminal) law enforcement tools and legal harmonisation. 
3.4 Where are we now and where do we go next? 
It is therefore possible to identify three distinct, even if chronologically over-
lapping, phases in the development of EU labour law relating to, or at least 
affecting, children: a first phase where children were primarily incidental 
beneficiaries (1957-1990s); a second phase where children became full-
fledged direct beneficiaries (1990s-2000s); and a third phase of a bi-cepha-
lous nature (2000s-present). The Lisbon Agenda, the Europe 2020 Strategy 
and OMC processes are characterised by a considerable degree of instrumen-
talisation and utilitarianism in the way they deal with children’s interests and 
well-being. More recent (hard-law) labour-related initiatives, such as Di-
rective 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country na-
tionals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers,34 confirm this 
conclusion, as the rationale expounded again relates to pursuing a certain 
vision of economic development and no mention is made of the well-being of 
child or young workers. The analysis above is yet another sign that there are 
“conflicting messages about the currency of children’s rights at EU level and 
their vulnerability being diluted or overlooked in the face of competing polit-
ical and economic objectives” (Stalford and Drywood 2011).  
The vast economic benefits for society in general of keeping children in 
education for longer rather than letting them engage with the world of labour 
prematurely (ILO 2003) should be borne in mind, but still considered sec-
ondary in relation to the paramount interest of children’s own well-being. 
The EU should therefore refocus its children/youth agenda and any policies 
                                                          
32 OJ C 062, 2 March 2013, pp. 22-25. 
33 OJ C 044, 15 February 2013, pp. 115-118. 
34 Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 
on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment 
as seasonal workers. 
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affecting them towards the interests of children/youth themselves, rather than 
using discourses that more or less implicitly reveal the priority given to mar-
ket and economic objectives. This is essential if the EU is to have political 
legitimacy to offer assistance and examples of good practices in this field to 
partners around the world. The bottom line is that, even if there were no mar-
ket or economic benefits, fighting ‘child labour’, delaying children’s entrance 
into the labour market, and improving the working conditions of those chil-
dren engaging legally with the world of work should still be a political and 
legal priority. Before looking into ways of doing this, it is important to assess 
the degree of compatibility between the level of protection currently offered 
by the EU (in particular via the YWD), on the one hand, and supranational 
and international instruments, on the other hand. 
4. Compatibility with supra-national and international 
instruments 
4.1 The United Nations framework 
The ILO, as a UN agency specialised in labour, has been a key international 
actor in the fight against ‘child labour’. Its crucial instruments in this fight are 
Conventions No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employ-
ment (C138), adopted in 1973, and No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and 
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
(C182), adopted in 1999. These instruments are supported by the ILO’s In-
ternational Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), created in 
1992. C138 aims to progressively eliminate child labour and increase the 
minimum age to be admitted to work so as to ensure children’s ‘fullest physi-
cal and mental development’ (Article 1); C182, instead, focuses on the worst 
forms of child labour, namely those connected with slavery, pornography, 
illicit activities and (other) work harmful to children’s health, safety or mor-
als (Article 3). All EU Member States have ratified both Conventions, so the 
EU is indirectly bound by them to the extent that they contain human rights 
standards below which the EU cannot legislate (Article 53 CFR), but not 
beyond that (Hartwig 2008: 250ff). 
The YWD acknowledges the importance of the ILO principles in relation 
to the protection of young people at work (Preamble Consideration No. 4). 
Also, as suggested above (section 3.2), the YWD seems to align itself with 
the ILO instruments in all key aspects (minimum ages, scope for derogation, 
etc.). The wording adopted by the second paragraph of Article 1(1) YWD is 
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evidence of this, by setting 15 as the general minimum age and linking this 
minimum age to compulsory full-time schooling (precisely what Article 2(3) 
C138 has stated since 1973). Also, EU policies more generally combat the 
worst forms of child labour, by addressing trafficking and sexual exploitation 
(section 3.3 above). 
Still, in relation to a couple of aspects, the YWD may lag behind C138 
(the ILO has also held that the YWD lagged behind the ILO instruments, but 
the Commission has denied this: European Commission 1994). Whilst Article 
7(3) YWD allows Member States to derogate from the prohibition of work 
entailing specific risks in relation to ‘adolescents’ (ages 15-18) for training 
reasons, Article 3(3) C138 only allows such types of derogations above the 
age of 16 (although not limited to training reasons). One may argue that the 
YWD and ILO provisions in question are not entirely similar (as the YWD 
provision is linked to training and the C138 provision is not), so a strict paral-
lel cannot be drawn. Still, one should conclude that, in order to ensure Article 
7 YWD’s compatibility with Article 3 C138, the derogation in Article 7 
YWD should only be allowed in relation to children above the age of 16. 
Also, Article 2 C182, being a more recent instrument, has chosen to align its 
terminology with the CRC and uses the term ‘child’ for anyone under the age 
of 18 (Article 2), unlike the YWD. This reinforces the preferability of the 
word ‘children’ over distinguishing between ‘children’, ‘adolescents’ and 
‘young persons’. Moreover, Article 7(1) C182 expressly refers to penal sanc-
tions, although allowing other appropriate sanctions. Paragraph 12 of ILO’s 
Recommendation No. 190 also encourages Member States to punish as crim-
inal offences practices similar to slavery, child prostitution and pornographic 
activities, and other illicit activities. Whilst EU Directives on sexual exploita-
tion and trafficking favour criminal sanctions, the YWD makes no reference 
to criminal sanctions, thus leaving Member States free not to use criminal 
sanctions to punish conduct that may fall within the ‘worst forms of child 
labour’ but is not within the remit of the sexual exploitation and trafficking 
Directives. Even if criminal sanctions are not the most appropriate sanctions 
in certain instances (for example, when the perpetrators are the child’s family 
members, in which case civil and socio-economic measures may be more 
suitable), their availability in the context of the YWD would still be an asset. 
More important, both C138 and C182 clearly apply to both employment and 
work, thus not being limited to work relationships based on legally recog-
nised employment contracts. The YWD, instead, requires an employment 
contract or employment relationship as recognised by individual Member 
States. Whether ‘employment relationship’ is as broad as ‘work’ is doubtful; 
therefore, the EU should ensure the amendment of this terminology at the 
first possible opportunity.  
At any rate, mere compatibility is a very poor aim: the EU, as an organisa-
tion encompassing developed countries amongst the richest in the world, 
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should aim higher in terms of social and labour standards. Indeed, in the light 
of the economic and social progress in the EU, and considering that Article 
2(4) C138 states that “a Member whose economy and educational facilities 
are insufficiently developed may, after consultation with the organisations of 
employers and workers concerned, where such exist, initially specify a mini-
mum age of 14 years”, the EU, e contrario, should set the minimum age at 16 
or 17. Yet this suggestion raises problems that will be discussed below (sec-
tion 5). 
The UN framework has, however, contributed to the debate about working 
children not only through the ILO, but also through the CRC. Even before the 
CRC was approved, the 1924 (League of Nations) Geneva Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child and the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
established that children should be protected against every form of exploita-
tion (Articles 4 and 9 respectively). Article 32 CRC rephrased this obligation 
in terms of rights and rendered it binding on signatory states, by recognising 
children’s right to be protected from exploitative and harmful forms of work. 
Also, CRC Articles 11 and 35 on trafficking, 19 on abuse and neglect, and 34 
on sexual exploitation, are of relevance to children working under certain 
circumstances. 
Although the CRC had already been approved and all the EU Member 
States at the time had already signed it by the time the YWD was negotiated 
and approved, the CRC is not mentioned in the YWD. This is symptomatic of 
a greater problem: the lack of commitment by EU law and policy to interna-
tional children’s rights (Stalford and Drywood 2011: 199). The absence of 
any influence of the CRC on the YWD is reflected, as mentioned above, in 
the choice of terminology, as Article 3 distinguishes between ‘young per-
sons’, ‘children’ and ‘adolescents’, although all of these fall below the age of 
18. This lack of terminological consistency is secondary, though – substan-
tive shortcomings may have much deeper consequences.  
Some elements in the YWD may be linked to the principle of the evolving 
capacities of the child, which is a transversal principle in the CRC: Preamble 
Considerations Nos. 9 and 10 refer to the ‘nature of the transition from child-
hood to adult life’ and to the need to guarantee ‘working conditions appropri-
ate to [children’s] age’, and Article 1(3) YWD reinforces the latter idea. This 
principle could be used potentially to justify a more casuistic and individual-
ised approach to working children, i.e., allowing some children to engage 
with work earlier and others later, depending on their specific development, 
capacities and skills. Whilst an attractive thought, as it would allow an effec-
tive tailoring of the law to each child’s development and the safeguarding of 
children’s interests, this is in fact an impracticable solution: it would require 
a vast amount of resources to assess each individual case, and it would have 
the negative side-effect of opening up the system to abuse. The use of set 
ages (even if just presumed) to determine milestones in the legal rules appli-
278 Nuno Ferreira  
 
cable to children is a recognised necessity, for example in relation to criminal 
liability. Children who mature early may pursue their interests and foster 
their development even before they are able to engage with work, for exam-
ple by becoming involved with (unpaid, voluntary) sport, cultural and social 
activities.  
Strictly speaking, CRC’s substantive standards seem to be respected by the 
EU’s legal framework. Significantly, Article 1(3) YWD is compatible with 
the all-encompassing wording of Article 32(1) CRC. The fact that, contrary 
to Article 32(1) CRC, the YWD does not use the words ‘hazardous’ (in rela-
tion to work) and ‘spiritual’ (in relation to children’s development) is argua-
bly of no significance, since Article 1(3) YWD’s references to ‘safety’/
‘health’ and ‘moral or social development’ achieve the same result (McGlynn 
2002: 399). Nonetheless, the CRC is much more demanding and specific in 
relation to the range of enforcement measures (Article 32(2) CRC). These 
should include legislative, administrative, social and educational measures, 
including ‘appropriate penalties or other sanctions’ and not just ‘measures’ 
(Article 14 YWD). In the light of the growing alignment of the EU institu-
tions with the CRC, including the CJEU,35 the YWD could be amended to 
reflect the broader scope of the CRC. 
4.2 The Council of Europe framework 
The CoE has also contributed greatly to the framework that currently exists to 
address issues concerning working children, namely through its human rights 
instruments and institutions. The link between the regulation of work by 
children and human (including social) rights is evident, particularly in cases 
where some degree of exploitation can be identified. As Van Bueren high-
lights, the exploitation of children ‘usually involves cumulative breaches of 
several fundamental rights, the most common being unlawful interference 
with family life and the rights to education, health, and leisure, all of which 
are equally essential for the healthy development and survival of the child’ 
(Van Bueren 1995: 262). Some forms of exploitation of children, especially 
sexual exploitation and domestic servitude, may also amount to inhuman or 
degrading treatment and/or to slavery and forced labour (as seen in Siliadin v 
France36 and C. N. v United Kingdom37), thereby constituting violations of 
Articles 3 and 4 ECHR. 
                                                          
35 Beginning in C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Judgment 
of 27 June 2006, and most recently in C-348/09, P.I. v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Rem-
scheid, Judgment of 22 May 2012. 
36 Application No. 73316/01, Decision of 26 July 2005. 
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There are no signs of lack of compatibility between the EU law analysed 
above and the relevant ECHR provisions and ECtHR case-law. Also, bearing 
in mind the level of protection offered to working children by EU law, the 
lack of involvement of the EU with direct enforcement of labour law policies 
within Member States, the use of the ECHR by the EU, and the use of the 
principle of the margin of appreciation in the application of the ECHR, it is 
unlikely that the accession of the EU to the ECHR, as foreseen in Article 6(2) 
TEU, will be of any relevance to the situation of working children in Europe. 
Also, within the context of the CoE, it is worth mentioning the 1996 (Re-
vised) European Social Charter. Although 10 out of the 27 EU Member 
States are not bound by this Treaty, they are bound by the original 1961 ESC, 
which contains similar, slightly lower, standards (including in relation to 
working children). The bodies responsible for the enforcement of the ESC 
have dealt with matters related to working children, namely age limits, the 
notion of light work, and enforcement.38 Yet, the ESC weak supervision 
mechanism, combined with the predominance of the CoE Committee of Min-
isters over the European Committee of Social Rights (which has tried to up-
hold higher socio-economic standards), have prevented the ESC from pro-
ducing substantial changes in reality (Cullen 2000). The ESC remains, how-
ever, a significant international instrument setting minimum labour and social 
standards, including in the EU context, as evidenced by the reference to the 
ESC in Article 151 TFEU. Articles 7 and 17 ESC specifically regulate the 
protection of children. It can be asserted that, partly due to its overall flexible 
wording and consensual content, EU law, and the YWD in particular, com-
plies with the ESC. EU provisions do not regulate pay, which is one of the 
elements mentioned in Article 7(5) and (7) ESC: the EU’s lack of compe-
tence in that regard (Article 153(5) TFEU) would not permit it.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the CoE’s instruments on trafficking (2005 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings) and sexual 
exploitation (2007 Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse). The fact that not all EU Member States have 
ratified these instruments and, consequently, are not bound by these instru-
ments, makes the EU instruments all the more important to protect children 
from economic exploitation.  
At any rate, the CoE is responsible for setting minimum standards poten-
tially applicable to a large number of countries (currently 47), as opposed to 
the EU, which is in a much better position to set higher standards across a 
more limited geographical area. One can thus legitimately expect the EU to 
go much further than what is prescribed by the ESC and the ECHR. 
                                                          
37 Application No. 4239/08, Decision of 13 November 2012. 
38 For relatively recent examples, see European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 
2011 – Albania – Article 7-1, 12 September 2011 (Doc. No. 2011/def/ALB/), and Conclu-
sions XIX-4 – Greece – Article 7-1, 12 September 2011 (Doc. No. 2011/def/GRC/). 
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4.3 The EU’s human rights framework 
The EU’s labour policy standards in relation to children also need to be con-
fronted with the EU’s own (increasingly strong) human rights agenda. The 
core of the EU’s human rights agenda lies in Article 6 TEU’s reference to the 
legally binding value of the CFR (discussed above in section 2), as well as 
the national constitutional traditions and ECHR constituting general princi-
ples of EU law. Crucially, Article 24 CFR establishes the right of children to 
protection, care and participation, compatibly with the principles of their best 
interests and evolving capacities. Article 32 CFR prohibits child labour and 
requires the protection of young people at work, allowing for derogations on 
grounds of ‘more favourable’ outcomes for the children in question (perhaps 
in an allusion to combined work/training or work-experience schemes: Ja-
cobs 2002:74). The CJEU started referring to Article 24 CFR even before the 
CFR became binding,39 but there has been no case dealing with Article 32 
CFR yet. Despite the broad terms adopted by these provisions, EU law argu-
ably falls short of the standards established in these provisions, particularly in 
Article 32 CFR. The second paragraph of Article 32 states that “[y]oung 
people admitted to work must have working conditions appropriate to their 
age and be protected against economic exploitation and any work likely to 
harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or social development or 
to interfere with their education.” To the extent that exploitation may occur in 
the context of areas where EU law may be derogated from (including domes-
tic and family settings, and cultural or similar activities), and in the light of 
the weak enforcement mechanisms imposed at EU level, several aspects of 
the YWD may be considered in violation of Article 32 CFR. The main obsta-
cle to this, however, is the fact that the Explanations relating to the CFR 
indicate that Article 32 is based, among others, on the YWD. With such a 
circular legal mechanism, any scope for using the CFR to improve the situa-
tion of working children could be severely curtailed, making a mockery of 
the ‘fundamental rights check-list’ system and impact assessment mechanism 
devised by the European Commission. Still, the CJEU or other institutions 
may decide to overlook the Explanations relating to the CFR and take a gen-
erous approach to Article 32 CFR, perhaps based on a principle of evolutive 
interpretation. 
Article 21 CFR is also relevant to working children, as it prohibits dis-
crimination on grounds, inter alia, of age. This provision does not add any-
thing to what the Framework Directive already does for working children – 
or at least there is no judicial evidence of the use of this provision to protect 
the rights of working children beyond the scope of the Framework Directive. 
                                                          
39 C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, Judgment of 27 June 
2006. 
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Also, Advocate-General Scharpston, supporting the Commission’s submis-
sion, has even asserted (expounding a legally doubtful reasoning) that ‘there 
is no need to refer to the Charter where EU law is already explicit on the 
matter. Nor, a fortiori, can the Charter provide grounds for justification of 
unequal treatment where such grounds would otherwise be absent.’40 At any 
rate, in the case of conflict between Article 21 CFR and the Framework Di-
rective, on the one hand, and the YWD, on the other, the Court would most 
likely consider the YWD provisions justifiable in the light of being backed by 
ILO instruments and Member States’ international commitments (Cullen 
2004: 329).  
This analysis would be incomplete without a reference to the 1989 Com-
munity Charter, discussed above in section 2. This instrument is still held to 
be valid and relevant, being mentioned in Article 151 TFEU and the Pream-
ble to the CFR, and courts being able to use it as an interpretative tool. Para-
graphs 20-23 refer to the ‘protection of children and adolescents’. Whilst the 
Charter’s minimum age of 15 and compulsory school age criteria (Paragraph 
20) are respected by the YWD, the need to ensure ‘equitable remuneration’ 
(Paragraph 21) is not mentioned anywhere in EU (hard-)law. Also, although 
working conditions, in particular working time, are regulated by the YWD in 
terms generally compatible with Paragraph 22, there is no provision in the 
YWD clearly preventing Member States from circumventing working time 
rules by using overtime (as established in Paragraph 22). Also, despite em-
phatic soft-law measures in this regard, an entitlement to vocational training 
(Paragraph 23) is missing from EU hard-law. If one considers that Paragraphs 
20 and 22 are mentioned in the Preamble to the YWD, but Paragraphs 21 (on 
remuneration) and 23 (on vocational training) are omitted, then it becomes 
clear which of the Charter’s ‘moral’ obligations the EU institutions intended 
to fulfil. Equitable remuneration and entitlement to vocational training are, 
therefore, left to the luck of the OMC. As seen above, the OMC attempts to 
deal with these matters (at least with training), but as discussed in the next 
section, such crucial matters should not be wholly delegated to the OMC 
process. 
                                                          
40 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 20 September 2012, in C-363/11, 
Epitropos tou Elegktikou Synedriou sto Ypourgeio Politismou kai Tourismou v Ypourgeio 
Politismou kai Tourismou – Ypiresia Dimosionomikou Elenchou. 
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 5. Scope for improvement and policy recommendations 
As discussed in section 1, there are compelling reasons in favour of delaying 
the entrance of children into the labour market and, more generally, of pre-
venting children from carrying out work that may in any way affect their 
psychological or physical full development. Even economic arguments (sec-
ondary when one is considering the best interests of children) point towards 
this policy: investing in education and training, rather than using a young and 
unskilled work force, is the best way to secure a society made of individuals 
capable of contributing towards an innovative and sustainable world (Euro-
pean Commission 2012b). The alternative is the perpetuation of a low-paid 
and low-skilled work force for the sake of short-term gain (but with long-
term negative consequences). Fears relating to children’s enhanced exploita-
tion within the ‘black economy’ have not materialised; in fact, some Member 
States have even reported a significant increase in the employment rate of 
older children (e.g., Sweden, in relation to 16- to 17-year-olds). These fears 
should therefore not be used as arguments in favour of retaining the current, 
somewhat relaxed legal framework, let alone relaxing it further. The previous 
section explored several aspects where the current EU law on working chil-
dren needs to be improved to comply fully with international and EU funda-
mental standards. The involvement of children with the world of labour falls 
neatly within the competence (even if shared) of the EU, and the EU is in a 
privileged position to address any lingering issues. Several areas within the 
EU’s remit require attention; this section will, however, concentrate on the 
YWD substantive standards, due to their particular relevance to most work-
ing children. 
Overall, the YWD could become stricter, as supported by some Member 
States (e.g. Greece: European Commission 2004). Firstly, and most signifi-
cantly, the general minimum age now set at 15 in the YWD should be raised 
to 16, if not 17, in order to prevent children from starting work too early and 
to enhance their qualifications – for the sake either of children’s preparation 
for the labour market or of a more qualified society generally, but always 
with children’s best interests as the overall guiding principle. This would be 
consistent with the need to align the working minimum age with the age of 
compulsory full-time schooling (Article 1(1) YWD, Article 2(3) C138). This 
is also in line with ILO Recommendation No. 146 (Article 7(1)), approved in 
1973 (at the same time as C138). Although ideally the EU would follow this 
Recommendation and lead the way world-wide in this context, it cannot be 
ignored that this suggestion needs to be fitted together with the education 
system of the Member States, as children may not be left without a place in 
the education system and without the right to seek employment. Currently, 
the majority (15) of EU Member States already set the compulsory school 
 Child Labour and EU Law and Policy 283 
 
age at 16 (for full-time education), whilst one sets it at 14, seven at 15, one at 
17, two at 18, and one allows different ages in different parts of its territory 
(Eurydice 2014). This means that, before the working minimum age could be 
raised to 16, those Member States which currently set the compulsory school 
age at 14 or 15 would need to raise it to 16. Since the EU would not be able 
to adopt any binding measures in this regard due to its limited competence in 
this field (Articles 6, 9 and 165-166 TFEU), any harmonisation would have 
to be achieved through the OMC. 
Secondly, there is a strong case in favour of reducing the loopholes in the 
YWD. To begin with, the YWD should (at least potentially) apply to any 
work, independently of Member States considering it to be ‘employment’ or 
an ‘employment relationship’; hence Article 2 should be amended, namely in 
order to offer some degree of protection to children who are service providers 
and/or self-employed. Also, as discussed above, currently Article 2(2) allows 
Member States to exclude from the protective scope of the legislation occa-
sional or short-term work involving domestic service in a private household 
or non-harmful work for a family undertaking. Considering the evidence of 
the continued existence of grave abuses in these contexts in EU Member 
States (Milieu 2009b), and the fact that inspecting these areas is difficult, the 
EU should strongly consider the non-derogable inclusion of these areas with-
in the scope of the YWD. The risk of going against the opinion of some of its 
Member States could be tempered with using lighter touch regulation for this 
type of work, thus at least not allowing it to remain outside the scope of EU 
law altogether. A similar move is favoured in relation to the ILO instruments 
by Van Bueren, who finds support in the lack of derogations in the CRC 
provisions (Van Bueren 1995: 266). It is also important to refer to those chil-
dren performing artistic, sport or other activities allowed by law, but who fall 
outside the protection of labour legislation due to the civil law nature of the 
relationship in question. This problem has occurred in Romania, for example, 
where ‘civil contracts for performance of services’ have been used to escape 
labour legislation (Milieu 2009b) and cannot be addressed by the YWD pro-
visions as they stand today. Without calling into question the possibility of 
children participating in such activities, as they can be beneficial to their 
physical and mental development, EU law should (through the YWD or an-
other instrument) ensure that children are protected from economic exploita-
tion and by high levels of health and safety even outside the remit of Member 
States’ labour law frameworks (the approach followed by Hungary: Cal-
vo/Rodríguez 2007: 4). More generally, exceptions related to artistic, sport or 
advertising activities should be rethought and submitted to more precise re-
quirements at EU level beyond the prior authorisation of the Member State’s 
competent authority (Article 4(1) YWD). 
Thirdly, the notion of light work could be clarified, perhaps by excluding 
the possibility of considering whole sectors of activity as ‘light work’ as, 
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within most sectors (e.g. agriculture), there may be ‘light’ and ‘non-light’ 
activities. Moreover, even when considering an activity to be ‘light work’, it 
should be subject to health and safety regulations, as even when carrying out 
‘light work’ children may run risks. Also, an annexe should be added to the 
directive with a non-exhaustive list of activities constituting ‘light work’.41 
The same could be done with regard to the notion of ‘dangerous work’, as 
suggested by a Member State (European Commission 2004: point 5). In rela-
tion to both these notions, as well as more generally, the YWD could make 
less use of open-textured words and concepts, following the lead of the ESC 
(Cullen 2000: 20). 
Fourthly, and ideally, the EU would acquire competence in relation to pay 
and use it with regard to working children. If the EU were able to harmonise 
(and enforce) an obligation of equal pay between working children and 
adults, perhaps the situation would drastically change. Indeed, it is worth 
looking into the ‘unappreciated potential’ of the principles of fair remunera-
tion and equal pay for equal work: “if children were paid equally to adults 
would child labour be so widespread?” (Van Bueren 1995: 271). 
Fifthly, the categories of children/adolescents/young persons should be re-
placed by the single category of ‘children’ – the distinction between legal and 
illegal work should be made exclusively on the basis of minimum ages and 
the characteristics of the work. Besides enhancing consistency with the CRC, 
the current EU agenda on children’s rights and other EU law instruments 
(such as the sexual exploitation and the trafficking Directives), this amend-
ment would also simplify greatly the transposing domestic provisions and 
avoid or render less excusable regressions in this regard, as has happened in 
Romania, for example (Milieu 2009b). 
Finally, and despite the obstacles that may be raised on grounds of (lack 
of) competence, the EU should continue to encourage Member States to take 
a more holistic and CRC-friendly approach, informed by the indivisibility 
and interdependence of human rights, and consider the relevance of social, 
economic and educational measures in the enforcement of the applicable 
legal framework by labour inspectorate authorities and other actors. Knowing 
that the EU can legislate on health, safety and working conditions through the 
ordinary procedure (Article 153(2) TFEU), i.e., by engaging both the Parlia-
ment and the Council on a quasi-equal standing (Article 294 TFEU), allied 
with the fact that either the Parliament or the Council can take the initiative 
of requesting to the Commission to submit proposals (Articles 225 and 241 
TFEU), offers some justifiable hope to the possibility of a more children’s 
rights-centred approach being adopted in the field of labour. 
                                                          
41 Something the European Economic and Social Committee already suggested: Opinion on 
the proposal for a Council Decision on the Protection of Young People at Work (92/C 313/
19), 23 September 1992, OJ No C 313/92 P 70, 30 November 1992, point 2.4.2. 
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 6. Conclusion 
No doubt, any recommendation to strengthen EU law affecting working chil-
dren will be met by Eurosceptics with arguments relating to competence-
creep, excessive costs, negative impact on the economy and detriment to 
national sovereignty. But that is a criticism that Eurosceptics would direct 
against almost any action suggested by the EU, so it does not engage with the 
actual problem and arguments at hand. And one may of course criticise the 
current legal framework or an even more restrictive one for being overly 
protective and, consequently, favouring protection to the detriment of chil-
dren’s participation, autonomy and privacy rights (as discussed in section 1). 
That may well be an attractive criticism, but it is one that forgets that the 
‘exercise’ of those rights is most commonly to the benefit of others (employ-
ers and families) and detriment of children themselves, by entrapping them in 
a likely life-long cycle of low-skilled and low-pay employment. The larger 
picture entailed by this is the perpetuation of poor social and working stand-
ards, race-to-the-bottom-style competition, and a society unprepared to face 
the economic, environmental and technological challenges posed to us all in 
the future. Risks of clandestine work or diminishing opportunities of em-
ployment or training do not derive from the YWD or any other EU measures 
related to children. At any rate, none of these risks should be used credibly as 
an argument to override the principle of protection: rather than relaxing the 
rules, they should be enhanced and their enforcement secured. This would 
also send a strong moral message to non-EU countries and promote inside 
and outside EU borders higher socio-economic standards on a long-term 
basis. 
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